Koslicki on matter and form by Meixner, Uwe
Koslicki on Matter and Form
ZH HL QHU JVE UJ
KH E RUP DWWHU EVWDQFH , Kathrin Koslicki offers an inter
pretation of hylomorphism. For obvious reasons, any interpretation of
hylomorphism is based on a certain conception of matter ( K Oē ) and on a
certain conception of form ( PRUSKē ). It is, therefore, a natural approach
to Kathrin Koslicki’s hylomorphism to examine its basic conceptions of
H I
Koslicki favours a conception of matter which she calls » Matter as
Hylomorphic Compounds « ( p.  ) or » The Hylomorphic Conception of
Matter « ( p. 57 ). She offers two formulations of this conception, one with
amendment and one without. The formulation ZLWKR W amendment is this :
»  DWWHU DV ORPRUSKLF RPSR QGV : The material parts of
matter-form compounds are themselves matter-form com
pounds. « (   )
KH I O ZLWK amendment is this :
»  DWWHU DV ORPRUSKLF RPSR QGV : Thematerial parts of mat
ter-form compounds are themselves matter-form compounds, un
less or until we reach an empirically con rmed level in the com
positional hierarchy at which the material parts of matter-form
compounds are not themselves structured wholes. « ( 59 )
According to Koslicki, the amendment is added » [ i ]n order for the hy
lomorphic conception of matter to be compatible with [ … ] alternative
possibilities for what might underlie substantial change at micro-physical
levels « ( 59 ). Which alternative possibilities does she have in mind ? They
are the following two :
» ( i ) the possibility of in nitely descending chains consisting of
ever smaller matter-form compounds whose material parts are
themselves matter-form compounds «;
» ( ii ) the possibility that we might eventually reach a point in
the compositional hierarchy at which matter-form compounds
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are composed of material parts which are not themselves struc
tured wholes. « ( 59 )
From the logical point of view, the following needs to be said about this :
Koslicki’s QDPHQGHG Hylomophic Conception of Matter does not need to
be made compatible with possibility ( i ); for it entails the actuality of this
possibility : if the material parts of matter-form compounds are themselves
matter-form compounds, then there are bound to be in nitely descending
chains consisting of ever smaller matter-form compounds whose material
parts are themselves matter-form compounds. At least, this is bound to be
the case if every matter-form compound has D SURSHU material part, and I
don’t see how it could be the case that some matter-form compound has no
proper material part; if it didn’t have one ( in other words, if every material
part of it were identical with it ), why call it a » matter-form compound « ?
It would not be a PDWHULDO FRPSR QG, and a fortiori not a PDWWHU IRUP
FRPSR QG
Thus, Koslicki’s QDPHQGHG Hylomorphic Conception of Matter
leads to an in nite regress of composition. I don’t think that Aristotle
would have relished this consequence. Koslicki’s DPHQGHG Hylomorphic
Conception of Matter does, of course, avoid HQWDLOLQJ an in nite regress of
composition. However, it has other shortcomings, shortcomings it shares
with the QDPHQGHG Conception.
For one thing, Koslicki’s Hylomorphic Conception of Matter, wheth
H QDPHQGHG DPHQGHG, simply does not tell us what PDWWHU V
mean that it gives no de nition of matter; WKDW, perhaps, would be asking
too much. No, I mean that it does not give us any idea at all of what matter
might be. Why, on earth, is the Hylomorphic Conception of Matter called
» hylomorphic « by Koslicki ? Where is the K Oē in it ? It seems that K Oē
PDWWHU are just words here, and, to boot, entirely unnecessary words.
Without any loss of ontologically relevant content, Koslicki’s QDPHQGHG
Hylomorphic Conception of Matter can be reformulated as follows :
» The material parts of material particulars are themselves ma
terial particulars. «
And without any loss of ontologically relevant content, Koslicki’s DPHQG
HG Hylomorphic Conception of Matter can be reformulated as follows :
» The material parts of material particulars are themselves ma
terial particulars, unless or until we reach an empirically con
rmed level in the compositional hierarchy at which material
particulars are composed of material parts which are not them
selves structured wholes. «
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Evidently, the DPHQGHG Hylomorphic Conception of Matter allows the
possibility that, at some level of composition ( Koslicki has in mind some
micro-physical level ), the material parts of material particulars might not
be material particulars. This entirely negative idea, without positive con
ceptual content, is all that Koslicki has to offer in the direction of a proper
conception of matter. For someone who wishes to » defend a hylomorphic
approach to the metaphysics of concrete particular objects « (   ) this seems
to me a bit meagre. Where is the K Oē for the PRUSKē ?
A different way of putting my criticism is this : Koslicki is more or
less content with a UHODWLYH DQG QRPLQDO conception of matter : relative to a
given level of composition L, one can call the material particulars which,
on that level, compose a material particular X, WKH PDWWHU RI X UHODWLYH WR
L. Fine. But one might also call them WKH PDWHULDO SDUWV, or FRQVWLW HQWV,
RI X UHODWLYH WR L. And this would have the advantage of being far less
misleading for readers who, not unreasonably, expect to be told some
thing with V EVWDQWLDO H E K ORmorphism ( or as one also says
today : K OHmorphism ). We should recall here that one of the meanings
of » substance « – in fact, an Aristotelian meaning – is PDWWHU; the word
» substance « always carries the connotations of ontological absoluteness,
primacy, ultimacy, in any case, the connotations of the non-relative and
non-intermediate. Thus, what is ontologically reducible to something else
EH PDWWHU, cannot be matter T D V EVWDQFH, cannot be SULPH PDW
WHU. And Koslicki’s relative matter ( or rather : relative matterV ) is ( are )
ontologically reducible – in a most obvious way – to something else : to
material particulars as parts of material particulars.
It is, moreover, surprising that Koslicki entirely ignores a central
concept of physics in her book : the concept of PDVV K V V OO KH H
surprising in view of her claim that the Hylomorphic Conception of Matter
is » the most promising option for the purposes of developing an analysis
of concrete particular objects that is compatible with our best scienti c
theories concerning the natural world « (   ). Our best scienti c theories of
the natural world are the theories of physics, and PDVV V H I KH V
important concepts of physics. DVV is the quantity of matter, just as VSD
WLDO H WHQVLRQ is the quantity of space, and G UDWLRQ the quantity of time.
One of the central laws of physics used to be the Law of the Preservation of
Mass. Since the Einsteinian revolution this one-time preservation law and
the one-time Law of the Preservation of Energy have been welded together
into the Law of the Preservation of DVV QHUJ . Some people, treating
2 This meaning is, recognizably, still alive today – not so much in philosophy as in chemistry
and pharmacology.
3 In view of this, one might quip : This is QRW hylomorphism, this is PHUHRPRUSKLVP ( as ap
plied to material particulars ).
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mass as a form of energy, prefer to continue speaking of the Law of the
Preservation of Energy, thus giving this old designation a new interpreta
tion. But since not only mass is transformed into energy, but also energy
into mass, one might just as well continue to speak of the Law of the Pres
ervation of Mass, and give this RWKHU old designation a new interpretation.
In any case, WKH FRQVWDQF RI PDVV throughout physical transfor
mation processes that involve neither nuclear ssion nor nuclear fusion
V JO HV WKH FRQVWDQF RI PDWWHU K JK OO OH
physical transformation processes. And this directly contradicts Koslicki’s
purely relative conception of matter. Consider an iron statue. You can saw
it into pieces, you can pulverize it, or make it boil – the mass you are deal
ing with stays the same; and therefore – it stands to reason ( though, admit
tedly, it does not follow logically ) – also WKH PDWWHU you are dealing with
stays the same. But the collection of iron pieces that result by sawing, the
collection of iron particles that result by pulverization, and the collection
of wildly agitated iron atoms that result by heating to the boiling point are
GLIIHUHQW collections of material parts of the iron statue. Although each of
these collections can be called » the matter of the iron statue « UHODWLYH
certain level of composition ( or decomposition ), none of these collections
– nor any other complete collection of material parts of the iron statue – is
WKH PDWWHU of the iron statue; that is, WKH QRQ UHODWLYH DEVRO WH PDWWHU I KH
iron statue, the quantity of which is precisely WKH PDVV I KH V H
What is WKLV PDWWHU KH H LQ RI the iron statue ? What is
KH H LQ RI every other material particular ? We know some of its
effects : it resists acceleration and penetration, but can be accelerated and
penetrated; it absorbs and gives off energy; its various chunks – distributed
in the various material particulars – mysteriously attract each other. It is the
source – » the mother « : PDWHU PDWHULD – of all material possibilities : They
OO H KH SRWHQWLD PDWHULDH, in the potency of matter; they only need to
EH ERUQ, need to be DFW DOL HG
None of these familiar and highly interesting, Aristotelian and New
tonian aspects of PDWWHU ( PDWHULD ), and therewith D IRUWLRUL I K O
phism, can be found in Koslicki’s book. Instead, we encounter the peculiar
irony that the conception of matter which is closest to the true spirit of hy
lomorphism is envisaged by Koslicki only at the far horizon of remote pos
sibility : there where her own ( purely ) relative conception of matter might
possibly give out, might possibly no longer apply. To quote again what has
already been quoted before : » [W] e might eventually reach a point in the
compositional hierarchy at which matter-form compounds are composed
of material parts which are not themselves structured wholes. « ( 59 ) Yes,
those unstructured material parts – deep in the depth of the micro-world –
would be truly PDWWHU, and matter we would, so to speak, KDYH R U KDQGV
RQ : our epistemic grasp of it would be as close as it can be for us. This,
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however, would not mean that we had not been dealing withPDWWHU O H
all the time, with what is trulyPDWWHU LQ RI the material particulars.We
have been dealing – and are all the time dealing – with matter, with K Oē,
but – of course – always, always under a form, under a PRUSKē.
The matter in and of a material particular can be, and normally is,
also the matter in and of quite another material particular – earlier, later, or
even at the same time; this is so because one and the same portion of matter
can and does receive different substantial forms, one such form after the
other, or even two such forms at the same time. Moreover, the matter in
and of numerically the same material particular can be, and often is, differ
ent at different times; this is so because one and the same substantial form
can and does successively assume different portions of matter.4
KHVH H WKH IDFWV RI K ORPRUSKLVP. Any philosophical interpreta
tion of hylomorphism must respect them – or it is not an interpretation of
hylomorphism. Does Koslicki’s interpretation of hylomorphism respect
WKH IDFWV RI K ORPRUSKLVP ?
Koslicki holds that forms – the forms needed for hylomorphism, I
will also call them » substantial forms « – are individual forms ( 103 ), i.e.,
that they are particular or individual entities; hence it would be rational
for her not to believe that any form needed for hylomorphism is a general
form, is a universal or general entity. The logically exclusive difference
between individual entities and general entities is described by her in the
following way : » I understand the distinction between universal or general
entities, on the one hand, and particular or individual entities, on the other
hand, as follows : entities of the former type are in principle repeatable,
i. e., they can be shared among multiple distinct entities by being wholly
present in each of them at a single time; entities of the latter type, in con
trast, by their very nature are not repeatable or sharable among multiple
distinct entities by being wholly present in each of them at a single time. «
( 62 ) Now, consider a substantial form – for example, my own substantial
form – which, as a matter of hylomorphic biological fact, was once wholly
present in a portion of matter distinct from the portion of matter that it is
now wholly present in. That this double, hence multiple instantiation of the
same substantial form does not refer to a single time but to two different
HV V DOO that saves Koslicki from having to admit that some form need
4 Do SRUWLRQV RI PDWWHU already have a form T D portions of matter ? It seems, if portions of
H K I T D portions of matter, we would be back at Koslicki’s » Matter as Hy
lomorphic Compounds « theory. However, a portion of matter does not already have a form
T D portion of matter. D portion of matter, it has no structure. All it has T D portion of
matter is a certain mass – and an in nitely determinable location in space, which means : the
space it occupies can be determined ever more precisely ZLWKR W ever reaching the point at
which the space it occupies is determined perfectly precisely. For more on this, see HL
QHU, The Non-Physicalness of Material Objects : RQQHIHOGHU QJJDGLHU FKLFN
( eds ) Unity and Time in Metaphysics ( Berlin 2009 ), 46–66.
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ed for hylomorphism is not an individual entity after all, but a general one.
If the generality of an entity is de ned slightly more liberally, as » can be
shared among multiple distinct entities by being wholly present in each of
KH DW VRPH WLPH RU RWKHU, « and the individuality of an entity is de ned
slightly more strictly, as » cannot be shared amongmultiple distinct entities
by being wholly present in each of them DW VRPH WLPH RU RWKHU, « then
substantial form turns out to be a general form, and QRW an individual form,
and the claim that every form needed for hylomorphism is an individual
form is falsi ed – RU H V J H H H I KH I V I K O
phism. What am I aiming at here ? What is the point of my criticism ? My
point is that Koslicki’s position concerning the fundamental ontological
K H I IRUPV – that they are individual entities, individual forms –
does not seem to be theoretically robust, since a mere modi cation of the
relevant de nitions – a plausible modi cation – overturns that position
( given one does not ignore or deny the facts of hylomorphism ).
In fact, however, no modi cation of de nitions – of Koslicki’s de
nitions – is necessary for overturning Koslicki’s position. Time and again
there have been reports of the bilocation of persons, usually of VDLQWV :
reports of their being at two separate places at the very same time. For
refuting the proposition that forms are individual entities we need not be
lieve that those reports are true, we only need to believe that, LQ SULQFLSOH,
they can be true. If the bilocation of a human person – of DQ given human
person – is possible ( and I think it is possible ), then this means that one
and the same person can be at two separate places at the same time, and,
hylomorphically speaking, this means nothing else than that one and the
same substantial form – namely, the substantial form of the bilocated hu
man person – can inform two distinct portions of matter at a single time;6
5 Given any human person, God could certainly cause his/her bilocation, whether the human
person is a saint or not.
6 This may seem perfectly impossible. But it is admitted on all sides ( by hylomorphistically
oriented philosophers ) that the substantial form of a human person can GLDFKURQLFDOO LQ
IRUP two distinct portions of matter; in fact, this is often the case. Why should it be perfectly
impossible – that is, not even in principle possible – that it V QFKURQLFDOO LQIRUPV two dis
tinct portions of matter ? The psychology of bilocation is certainly dif cult, but for allowing
the possibility of bilocation, it would be unfair to require that all questions relating to it must
be uncontroversially answerable. One such question is this : How many material particulars
are involved in the bilocation of a human person ? My answer is : KUHH ( one human person
and two coordinated bodies of that same person, both bodies taken » in abstraction « from the
person – who, indeed, LV a material particular, but QRW PHUHO a material particular ). If God
reconstituted the body of 10-year-old Lisette as it was on her tenth birthday and put it face to
face with 65-year-old Lisette on her 65 K birthday, how many material particulars would be
involved in WKLV case ? Is WKLV case, too, a case of bilocation ? My answer is : R, it is not; for
in the case in question there HLWKHU would be four material particulars : a ten-year-old person
DQG her body ( the latter taken » in abstraction « from the person ) LQ RQH SODFH, and a 65-year-
old person DQG her body ( taken » in abstraction « ) LQ WKH RWKHU SODFH; hence : QR ELORFDWLRQ RI
D SHUVRQ U there would be three material particulars : a mindless zombie-body ( perfectly
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or saying it in Koslicki’s very words, it » can be shared among multiple
distinct entities by being wholly present in each of them at a single time. «
Using Koslicki’s de nition of generality, it follows that the substantial
forms of human persons are general entities, that they are general forms,
and not individual forms.
And there is another somewhat surprising conclusion waiting for us.
Consider a portion of matter that receives two substantial forms at the
same time, thus becoming the matter, at one and the same time, of two
material particulars. ( That this can and does happen is one of the facts of
hylomorphism. ) Here one can very well say the following : One and the
same entity – i. e., the said portion of matter – is shared among two, hence
P OWLSOH entities by being wholly present in each of them at a single time.
All that prevents one from concluding that some portion of matter is a gen
eral entity is the worry that the matter-sharing entities, though different, are
perhaps not GLVWLQFW. But what is GLVWLQFWQHVV ? Does the word » distinct «
mean more than the word » different « ? If not, then some portion of matter
is a general entity; then, in fact, many portions of matter are general en
tities, since the simultaneous reception, by a portion of matter, of several
substantial forms is a quite FRPPRQ hylomorphic fact. Consider the iron
statue, the lump of iron, the cloud of iron atoms : one and the same portion
of matter, but three different substantial forms, and, accordingly, three dif
ferent material particulars that occupy one and the same region of space at
H KH V H H
Is it a bad thing if portions of matter turn out to be general entities –
as I think they do ? If they turn out to be QLYHUVDOV  ? This result, of course,
contradicts tradition, which has it that PDWHULD HVW SULQFLSL P LQGLYLG D
WLRQLV, and those materialists who are also nominalists will certainly not
be amused by the claim that portions of matter are universals. One should
keep in mind here that portions of matter, though they are universals, are
nevertheless not forms, hence D IRUWLRUL not general forms. People, when
they hear the word » universal « or » general entity « applied to something,
I H OO K K K V V H K J V V EH JH H O IRUP
This automatism is not justi ed : portions of matter are general entities,
universals, but they are not general forms; they are not forms at all. Keep
J K V VK O O H H HV V H J V KH V JK K
portions of matter are general entities.
Contrary to what Kathrin Koslicki believes, the substantial forms of
human persons are general entities, and, of course, general forms. Now, in
order to make this result more palatable, one should keep in mind that the
substantial forms of human persons are general entities QRW DOUHDG ZLWK
imitating a ten-year-old person in the physical respect ) LQ RQH SODFH, and a 65-year-old per
V DQG her body ( taken » in abstraction « from the person ) LQ WKH RWKHU SODFH; hence again :
QR ELORFDWLRQ RI D SHUVRQ
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UHVSHFW WR PDWHULDO SDUWLF ODUV; they turn out to be general entities only
if the eld of application for such forms is widened – as it certainly must
be under hylomorphism – to include SRUWLRQV RI PDWWHU. It is true, as we
have seen, that my substantial form, in Koslicki’s words, » can be shared
among multiple distinct entities by being wholly present in each of them at
a single time. « But it is, of course, not true that my substantial form can be
shared among multiple distinct PDWHULDO SDUWLF ODUV by being wholly pres
ent in each of them at a single time; my substantial form is P V EV O
form, it can never ever be the substantial form of any other material par
ticular; it is my personal essence. It is only true – DV ZH KDYH VHHQ – that my
V EV O I FDQ be shared among multiple distinct SRUWLRQV RI PDWWHU
by being wholly present in each of them at a single time.
Hylomorphism is the doctrine that material individuality has two
roots, matter and form. Hylomorphism is intended to give an ontologi
cal explanation of material individuality : Roughly, a material individual
results if a certain form and a certain matter come together, are united.
On pain of in nite regress, the account of matter and form which must
undergird the hylomorphic account of material individuality must not al
ready involve an essential reference to material individuality. This can be
achieved LI portions of matter and substantial forms – the forms needed
for hylomorphism – are general entities, not individual entities; if only
KH uni cations – the K ORPRUSKHHV, if you like – are individual entities,
namely, material individuals, material particulars.
Kathrin Koslicki has some close encounters with in nite regresses
in her interpretation of hylomorphism. In nite regress threatens in her
merely relative account of matter, even though, admittedly, there is some
hand-waving on her part in the direction of an absolute account of matter.
And in nite regress threatens again in her individualistic account of forms.
She believes, as we have seen, that the forms needed for hylomorphism
are individual forms; she also believes » that the form of a hylomorphic
compound might serve as its principle of cross-world identity. «( 99 ) She
adds : » If forms are to supply necessary and suf cient conditions for the
cross-world identity of concrete particular objects, then facts about the
numerical identity of forms must either be taken as primitive or they must
themselves be explained by reference to some further cross-world identity
principle. « ( 99 ) Quite right. However, it is evident that the second strategy
harbours the danger of in nite regress. Koslicki, fortunately, » opt [ s ] for
the rst strategy which takes facts about the numerical identity of forms
as primitive. « ( 99 ) But if facts about the numerical identity of forms are
taken as primitive, why not also take facts about the numerical identity –
in particular, the cross-world identity – of concrete particular objects as
primitive ? The question is all the more urgent because forms, if taken to be
individual entities, do not seem to be individual entities in any better way
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than » concrete particular objects « ( i. e. – I take it – V EVWDQWLDO particulars
and, speci cally,PDWHULDO particulars ). Where is the explanatory or justi
catory advantage of the numerical identity of the IRUPHU individuals ( the
forms ) over the numerical identity of the ODWWHU individuals ( the concrete
particular objects ) ? Is, for example, my substantial form needed – and
V HH H V LQGLYLG DO entity – in order to justify WKDW – or explain
ZK – in the two true sentences » In the actual world, Uwe Meixner nev
er studied geography « and » In some possible world, Uwe Meixner once
studied geography « the singular term » Uwe Meixner « refers to the very
same concrete particular object, namely to PH ? It seems to me that my
substantial form – whether taken to be an LQGLYLG DO H JHQHUDO
one – is not required for the relevant justi cation or explanation. What is
true is this : My substantial form – which is, in fact, a JHQHUDO entity – is my
essence; it is instantiated by countless portions of matter ( in some possible
worlds even by several portions of matter DW WKH VDPH WLPH ); but as far as
the material particulars are concerned, it is instantiated only by me and can
be instantiated only by me. This makes me and my substantial form, and
KH HI H H O H KH H O H I V EV
tial form, LVRPRUSKLF, so to speak. None of the two is more basic than the
other, neither in the justi catory nor in the explanatory respect.
But, then, what is my substantial form, as distinguished from my
self, ontologically good for ? In general, what are substantial forms, as
distinguished from the material particulars which have them, ontologically
good for ? What is their utility in the theoretical respect ? I am tempted to
answer that not everything that exists must be good for something, just as
little as that everything that is good for something must exist. But no, my
real answer is this : The substantial form of a material particular serves
to explain the constancy of certain properties of that particular ( usually
they are called » its essential properties « ) : their constancy over the en
tire time of the particular’s existence in every world in which it exists.
And the substantial form of a material particular also serves to explain the
very existence of that particular – to explain its existence not causally, but
structurally, and certainly only in cooperation with matter, matter which
in many cases – though not in all – steadily comes and goes, while the
V EV O I V V 7
7 Concerning my views on hylomorphism, more can be found in HL QHU, Materiality and
Immateriality: RYRWQ RYDN (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics
(New York and London 2014), 201–220; and in HL QHU, Remarks on the Matter of Ma
teriality: QWHOPDQQ - DWWOHU (eds.), New Scholasticism Meets Analytic Philosophy
(Heusenstamm 2014), 3–17.
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Summary
This article criticizes in detail Kathrin Koslicki’s conceptions of matter and form
KH E RUP DWWHU EVWDQFH. It has the character of a pinpointed book
review : it does not aim to do justice to the book in its entirety, it only examines
some aspects of it – aspects, however, which are central to it. The verdict that
emerges from the article might be summed up as follows : Koslicki’s book misses
to a considerable extent the point of hylomorphism.
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